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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between individuals’ weight and their employ-
ment decisions over the life cycle. I estimate a dynamic stochastic model of individuals’
annual joint decisions of occupation, hours worked, and schooling. The model allows
body weight to affect non-monetary costs, switching costs, and distribution of wages
for each occupation; and also allows individuals’ employment decisions to affect body
weight. I use conditional density estimation to formulate the distributions of wages
and body weight evolution. I find that heavier individuals face higher switching costs
when transitioning into white collar occupations, earn lower returns to experience in
white-collar occupations, and earn lower wages in socially intensive jobs. Simulating
the model with estimated parameters, decreased occupational mobility accounts for
10 percent of the obesity wage gap. While contemporaneous wage penalties for body
weight are small, the cost over the life cycle is substantial. An exogenous increase in ini-
tial body mass by 20 percent leads to a 10 percent decrease in wages over the life course.
Keywords: Labor, occupational choice, obesity, dynamic discrete choice,
productivity, switching costs
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1 Introduction
How does body weight affect employment behavior and wages over the life cycle? We
know obesity yields high costs in the workplace.1 In addition to the oft cited health care
costs, estimates place annual workplace productivity costs of obesity between $12 and $30
billion. While obese workers miss 15 to 50 percent more work time than the healthy weight,
two-thirds of these productivity costs are due to decreased at-work performance. Reduced
productivity not only affects contemporaneous wages and employment decisions, but also
decreases subsequent pay increases and employment opportunities (Holmstrom, 1999). Body
weight today therefore affects expected future wages and labor market opportunities.
The workplace costs of high body weight are inherently dynamic and vary by occu-
pation. Studies have shown obesity leads to difficulty managing professional interpersonal
relationships and reduces stamina when performing physical tasks.2 While lower productivity
affects wages, difficulties with certain job requirements may yield additional non-monetary
costs and therefore influence occupational choices. An individual’s body weight may also
provide a signal about that individual’s self-discipline or work ethic, the value of which may
differ between occupations. Such a negative signal would lead to decreased occupational
mobility for individuals of higher body weight.3 Occupational differences in the costs of high
body weight provide additional motivation for modeling these costs as a part of forward-
looking individuals’ employment decisions. When an individual chooses an occupation, he
accrues human capital that is not perfectly transferable to other occupations (Kambourov
and Manovskii, 2009). Thus, contemporaneous occupational choice affects both expected
future wages and future occupational decisions. Finally, an individual’s body weight is itself
dynamic, and maybe affected by one’s choice of occupation and hours.
1See, for example Ricci and Chee (2005), and Andryeva (2014)
2See Pronk et al. (2004); Johar and Katayama (2012); Hamermesh and Biddle (1994); DeBeaumont
(2009); Han et al. (2009)
3Anecdotally, a hospital in suburban Houston, Texas recently instituted an explicit ban on the hiring of
employees who were at least moderately obese.
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Despite the inherent dynamic relationship between body weight and employment out-
comes, the existing literature on the subject has largely relied on static approaches and
abstracted from either occupational choice or wages.4 I formulate and estimate a dynamic
discrete choice model where body weight affects both the distribution of wage offers and non-
monetary costs of each employment alternative; and employment decisions subsequently
affect weight.5 Both the model and method follow in the dynamic discrete occupational
choice literature (Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Altug and Miller, 1998; Lee, 2005; Lee and
Wolpin, 2006; Flabbi, 2010; Sullivan, 2010; Gayle and Golan, 2012; Eckstein and Lifshitz,
2011; Yamaguchi, 2013; Baird, 2014). I construct indices of the intensity of mental, phys-
ical and social job requirements for each occupation to determine how the monetary and
non-monetary costs of body weight in the workplace vary with these requirements.
I estimate the parameters governing the individuals’ decision making process using
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort. The model is solved in a
finite-horizon setting, using backwards recursion, value function interpolation and maximum
likelihood estimation (Keane and Wolpin, 1994; Mroz and Weir, 2003). Consistent with
earlier work, I do not find large, direct wage contemporaneous penalties for high body weight
(Cawley, 2004). I do find that high body weight presents significant barriers to occupational
mobility and inhibits career development over the life cycle. Results indicate that one weight
class (35 pounds on a 6-foot male), leads to an additional $6,500 in switching costs when
transitioning into professional and managerial occupations. These switching costs account
for 25 percent of the occupational attainment gap between obese and non-obese workers. By
affecting early career occupational choices, these costs lead to differences in human capital
and subsequent wages. High body weight impedes career development in other ways as well.
Individuals of high body weight are also found to earn lower returns to experience in white
4Section 2 reviews papers that examine body weight and wages, or occupational choice and body weight,
or occupational choice and wages.
5The purpose of this paper is not to investigate the effects of employment decisions on weight, but rather
the opposite. The model permits employment decisions to affect body weight, but through a feedback
mechanism rather than modeling change in body weight as a choice.
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collar occupations, and face lower wages and higher non-monetary costs in socially intensive
jobs. The non-monetary costs (including switching costs) of employment are not recoverable
without modeling the individual’s forward looking employment decision.
I use semi-parametric methods to estimate the full distribution of wages (conditional on
body weight, experience, education, job requirements, etc.) inside the model. Individuals of
high body weight are much less likely to be observed in the upper quantiles of the distribution
of wages. All wage differentials for high body weight, including lower returns to white-collar
experience, education, and lower wages in socially intensive jobs, stem from the reduced
probability of receiving wage offers from the upper quartile of the wage distribution. The
combination of these results indicates that body weight is a significant impediment to career
progress in white collar occupations.
Using the estimated parameters of the model, I simulate the dynamic effects of a con-
siderable (5 BMI points) exogenous weight reduction on a 35 year-old individual. While
instantaneous effects are small (wages increase by 4 percent) the dynamic effects are sub-
stantial. Relative to the baseline, the 45 year old individual who experienced an exogenous
shock at age 35 is nearly 5 percent more likely to be in a managerial occupation, 10 per-
cent more likely to attain work in a sales or administrative occupation, and the individual’s
overall expected wage increases by 10 percent.
In summary, I find that while contemporaneous aggregate wage penalties for body
weight are small, that high body weight nevertheless presents significant costs to work-
ers. Over the life cycle, high body weight decreases occupational mobility, decreases wages,
increases non-monetary costs in socially intensive jobs, and particularly decreases the prob-
ability of receiving wage offers in the upper quantiles of the distribution of wages.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief motivation and background
on the relationships between body weight and employment outcomes. Section 3 describes
the relevant data: the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, 1979 cohort, the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT), O*NET and the ACCRA cost of living index. Section 4 details
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the dynamic model. Section 5 discusses identification and the empirical implementation
of the theoretical model. Section 6 contains the parameter results and discusses how the
model predicts the variation of interest in the data. Section 7 contains the counterfactual
simulations using the estimated parameters of the model, and Section 8 concludes with a
brief discussion.
2 Relevant Literature
This paper contributes to a few different subsets of the literature. Specifically, I con-
tribute to the literature on dynamic models of forward looking individuals’ occupational
decisions as cited above. Within that literature, this is first paper to examine differences
in earnings and occupational attainment on the basis of body weight in a dynamic dis-
crete occupational choice framework. In so doing, this paper extends the literature on body
weight and labor market outcomes. Most prior work in that literature has focused on the
effects of individuals’ weights on their wages, utilized static methods, and abstracted from
modeling occupational choice (Cawley, 2004; Pagan and Davila, 1997; Johar and Katayama,
2012; Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994; Han et al., 2009).6 Dynamic models of differences in
occupational choice and wage differences have more often been utilized in examining the
gender wage gap (e.g., Altug and Miller (1998); Gayle and Golan (2012); Eckstein and Lif-
shitz (2011); Flabbi (2010); Yamaguchi (2013)) and black-white wage gap (e.g., Keane and
Wolpin (2000); Bowlus and Eckstein (2002); Lehmann (2013)).
This paper also contributes to a growing literature where job requirements are in-
corporated into dynamic models as a determinant of occupational choice (Sanders, 2010;
Yamaguchi, 2012). In permitting contemporaneous employment decisions to affect future
body weight, I also contribute to the literature on how one’s employment behavior affects
6Notable exceptions to the lack of dynamic modeling include Gilleskie, Norton, and Han (2011) and Tosini
(2008), but neither study models occupational choice.
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one’s health (King et al., 2001; Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002; Kelly et al., 2011; Courte-
manche, 2009; Ravesteijn et al., 2014).
Additionally, this paper incorporates prospective wage differentials into a single-agent
occupational choice framework. Theoretically, the model seeks to merge Mincer (1958), Ben-
Porath (1967), and Becker (1957). Prior dynamic models in this area have have typically
used a general equilibrium approach and focused on search rather than occupational choice
to better identify discrimination. The structure of this model closely resembles Keane and
Wolpin (1997) and Sullivan (2010), focusing on how current and expected future monetary
and non-monetary costs affects individuals’ decisions over the life cycle. As Coate and Loury
(1993) show, anticipated wage differentials can affect the formation of human capital, which
affects subsequent wages. In this model, weight-related wage differentials are incorporated
into the individual’s dynamic optimization problem. Forward-looking agents choose occupa-
tions and amount of labor to supply mindful of expected future wages, returns to experience,
and switching costs, all of which vary by body weight.
There is also a small methodological contribution to the literature on dynamic models of
occupational choice regarding the distribution of unobserved wages. Often when integrating
over missing prices or wages, parametric distributions are assumed as in Stinebrickner (2001).
Here, I estimate the full distribution of wages inside the model using conditional density
estimation (Gilleskie and Mroz, 2004). When integrating over missing wages, I can use the
full estimated density of those unobserved wages when performing quadrature to calculate
choice probabilities.
3 Data
The data come from three sources. The data on individuals’ wages, employment de-
cisions, body mass, environments, and family states are from the National Longitudinal
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Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort (NLSY ’79). Data on job requirements comes from the Dictio-
nary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and its successor, the Occupational Information Network
(O*NET). City level data on food prices come from the 4th quarter reports from ACCRA
(formerly the Inter-City Cost of Living Index).
The NLSY ’79, conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, follows a nationally rep-
resentative cohort of youths initially aged 14-22 annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially
to 2010.7 Respondents were asked questions regarding family background, schooling, occu-
pation, hours of work, wages, criminal activity, health, etc. Weight data are recorded for
1981, 1982, and in each wave since 1985. The NLSY ’79 is the longest running nationally
representative panel that contains data on weight, wages, and employment decisions. The
estimation sample is restricted to white males. Individuals that missed an interview in the
biennial phase were dropped. 8 Table 1 details the sample construction. The final sample
consists of 29,693 person-year observations. Descriptive statistics for the full sample of white
males and the estimation sample are available in Table 2.
Table 1: Sample Construction
N Description
12,686 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort, full sample
3,720 Sample after restricting demographics to white males
2,566 Sample after dropping poor white and military oversample
1,291 Sample after dropping those individuals missing an interview in the biennial phase
1291 unique individuals yields 29,693 person/year observations
Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort
Individuals’ reported occupations are classified as one of five major categories from the
1970 Census Occupational Classification System.9 Table 3 lists the five occupation categories
7http:\\www.nlsinfo.org
8I restrict the sample to white males to keep an already heavily parameterized model computationally
feasible. Including females and other races would involve cultural norms, require parameters for demographic
shifters on all variables of interest. Similarly, keeping individuals who miss interviews during the biennial
phase would involve integrating over missing histories, choices and state variables during those years, creating
substantial additional computational difficulties.
9As the NLSY progressed, the occupation classification system was updated for the 1980 census (in 1983)
and the 2000 census (in 2002). Where necessary, I used BLS-provided crosswalks to convert more recent
occupation codes to the coarser 1970 SOC classification.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics- Full v. Working Sample of 1979 NLSY
Working Sample Full Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 17.36 2.25 17.89 2.31
Yrs. Ed.’79 10.41 2.83 10.33 2.71
Weight 144.50 29.69 145.50 29.70
Yrs. Ed ’98 13.52 5.57 13.02 4.99
Income 79 ($1,000’s) 17.81 13.18 14.78 12.50
Income 98 ($1,000’s) 27.14 26.84 25.52 26.53
# of Kids 0.34 0.71 0.37 0.74
Occupation Class Percentages, 1981
Variable Working Sample Full Sample
No Work 46.51 5.09
Professionals 5.70 5.31
Sales & Admin 16.44 14.76
Craftsmen 5.08 4.84
Laborers 13.15 11.60
Service 14.43 12.35
N 1,291 3,720
used in this research and displays the proportion of obese and non-obese individuals selecting
into these occupations for three time periods.
3.1 Preliminary Evidence on Weight, Wages, and Employment
Behavior
Preliminary examination of the data yields evidence of differences in optimal employ-
ment behavior and wages related to body mass. While this study treats body mass as a
continuous variable both theoretically and empirically, the following statistical analyses use
an indicator function for whether the individual is obese.10 Table 4 contains the results of
fixed effects regressions of log wages on a dummy variable for whether the individual is obese,
years of experience in each of the five occupational categories, indicators for if the individual
has graduated high school and college, family state, and a time trend. The results indicate
10The Centers for Disease Control define obesity as a Body Mass Index (kg/m2) of 30+.
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Table 3: Occupational Sorting - Proportions of Obese and Non-Obese Workers by Occupation
Category
Occupation 1: Occupation 2: Occupation 3: Occupation 4: Occupation 5:
Professionals Administrative Craftsmen Operatives Service
Technicals Clerical (Skilled) and Workers
Managers and Sales Blue Laborers
Ages Bt < 30 Bt ≥ 30 Bt < 30 Bt ≥ 30 Bt < 30 Bt ≥ 30 Bt < 30 Bt ≥ 30 Bt < 30 Bt ≥ 30
24-30 24.80 15.51 11.96 9.74 17.80 22.07 21.8 28.83 8.28 10.93
31-37 36.33 27.24 12.25 12.23 19.52 24.59 20.36 21.82 6.31 9.71
38-45 40.51 37.17 9.25 9.99 18.25 19.77 15.47 15.31 6.52 7.91
Table 4: Fixed Effect Regression of Log Wages on Experience, Obesity, and Family Variables
Occupation 1: Occupation 2: Occupation 3: Occupation 4: Occupation 5:
Professionals Administrative Craftsmen Operatives Service
Technicals Clerical (Skilled) and Workers
Managers and Sales Blue Laborers
Variable Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.)
Obese **-0.05 0.02 **-0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.03
H.S. 0.17 0.24 ***0.28 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10
College ***0.14 0.04 ***0.19 0.07 *0.16 0.10 **0.27 0.13 0.13 0.10
Experience (Occ. 1) **0.01 0.01 ***0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 **0.02 0.01
Experience (Occ. 2) **0.02 0.01 ***0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 *0.04 0.02
Experience (Occ. 3) -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 *0.01 0.01 **0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Experience (Occ. 4) **-0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01
Experience (Occ. 5) 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 **0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01 **0.02 0.01
Married **0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 ***0.03 0.01 ***0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
No. of Kids ***0.06 0.01 ***0.06 0.02 **0.03 0.01 ***0.01 0.01 *0.04 0.02
t ***0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Constant ***6.32 0.24 ***6.23 0.10 ***6.35 0.08 6.30 0.05 ***6.19 0.09
that obese individuals face lower wages, but these differences are statistically significant only
in ‘white-collar’ occupations. Additionally, returns to own and cross-occupational experience
vary by occupation. Experience in the five categories is not rewarded equally.
The data also show that individuals of high body mass exhibit differences in occupa-
tional choice frequencies that create subsequent differences in human capital. Figure 2 shows
that obese individuals are less likely to work in white collar occupations than the non-obese,
particularly early in their careers. Note the white collar occupations are also the ones that
exhibit negative wage differentials for body weight. It is unclear whether these differences
induce the observed differences in employment behavior. Another implication of these pre-
liminary results is that experience accrued in a given period may partially be determined
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by weight in earlier periods. Because experience affects future wages, understanding the re-
lationship between body mass and wages requires understanding how body mass influences
optimal employment behavior. From the regression and bar chart, note the obese sort into
the occupations that yield less valuable experience. Experience in blue collar and service
jobs is minimally valued in white collar occupations. The obese and non-obese also differ in
their occupational transition patterns. Table 10 (see Section 6) summarizes these differences.
Figure 3 depicts the difference in average real wages between obese and non-obese
workers for each of the five occupational categories for each age in the sample period. The
obese earn equal or lower wages than the non-obese in all categories. The differential in real
wages for white collar occupations quadruples over the sample period: obese workers earn
approximately one dollar per hour less than their non-obese counterparts at age 25, but four
dollars less at age 49.11
3.2 Dictionary of Occupational Titles and Occupational Informa-
tion Network
The data used to construct indices of job requirements come from the DOT and
O*NET. The data on job requirements are taken from the 1977 edition, 1982 updates, 1986
updates, and 1991 revision. In the mid-1990s, the DOT was deemed obsolete and replaced
with the O*NET, the first release of which was in 1998. In contrast to the DOT, the O*NET
is aligned with the Census system of occupation classification and provides information on
between 850-1000 ‘job families’. The O*NET focuses on white-collar occupations and on
information and service jobs, and it contains much finer numerical ratings (on level and im-
portance) for far more requirements per occupation. Appendix B contains additional details
on forming the requirement indices.
11Real wages are calculated using 1983 as the base year.
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3.3 ACCRA Data on Food Prices
Food price ratios were constructed using data from C2ER.12 The data contain prices of
commonly purchased items as reported by Chambers of Commerce in over 200 Metropolitan
Statistical Areas, including: T-bone steaks, ground hamburger, iceberg lettuce, tomatoes,
canned green beans, 2-piece fried chicken meals, McDonalds quarter-pounders, and Pizza
Hut/Pizza Inn 12-inch pizzas. I utilize annual data from 1976 to 2008 to construct a fast-
food-to-produce price index. These local indices are then linked to the Geocoded NLSY data.
These indices proxy for the costs of consuming healthy food relative to unhealthy food over
the sample period.13 Additional data on construction of food price ratios and geographic
matching is available in Appendix B.
4 Dynamic Stochastic Discrete Choice Model
I specify a dynamic stochastic model of employment behavior in which body weight
and the requirements of the job affect both the distribution of wages and non-monetary costs
of each alternative. Subsection 4.1 defines the set of alternatives. Subsections 4.2 and 4.3
define the components of contemporaneous utility from each alternative. Subsections 4.4
and 4.4.1 discusses the distribution of wages and growth of human capital. Subsection 4.5
discusses the weight transition equation and Subsection 4.6 assembles these components to
formulate the individual’s dynamic optimization problem in a value function framework.
4.1 Set of Alternatives
In this model agents jointly decide whether to work, how much to work, in which
occupation to work, and whether to attend school. There are a total of 23 alternatives,
12Formerly ACCRA and The Inter-City Cost of Living Index
13Utilizing ratios rather than levels will mitigate the confounding factors of both regional variation in cost
of living and food prices and changes in food price levels over time.
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hj ∈ HJ , available to an individual in each discrete period. The employment alternatives,
h, are:
h = 1 : work part time: weekly hours ∈ {15, 34}
h = 2 : work full time: weekly hours ∈ {35, 49}
h = 3 : work more-than-full-time: weekly hours ≥ 50
h = 4 : work part-time and attend school part-time
h = 5 : not work and attend school full time
h = 6 : not work and attend school part time
h = 7 : neither work nor attend school
(1)
The occupational alternatives available to an agent each period are denoted by j:
j = 0 : No occupation
j = 1 : Professionals,Technicals, Managers
j = 2 : Salesmen, Clerks, Administrative workers
j = 3 : Craftsmen
j = 4 : Operatives and Laborers
j = 5 : Service workers
(2)
If an agent chooses an employment alternative that includes work, (h ∈ {1, . . . , 4}), he
also chooses an occupation(j ∈ {1, . . . , 5}) jointly with that employment alternative.14 The
combination of the four h alternatives that involve work times the 5 occupational categories
plus h = {5, 6, 7} comprises the set of 23 alternatives. The indicator dhjt equals one if
employment alternative h and occupation j are chosen in period t, zero otherwise. I define
the vector dt =
(
dhjt , (∀j ∈ {1, . . . , 5}|h ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}), j = 0|h ∈ {5, 6, 7}
)
.
Agents make their first decision at age 17. Education entering a period t is captured by
accumulated years of school. Agents can either go to school full time, part time, or attend
school part time in conjunction with working part time.15 Degree attainment is determined
by years of schooling only, rather than modeled as a separate decision.
14If an agent chooses an employment/school alternative which does not include working, (h = {5, 6, 7}),
then j = 0 by definition.
15Details on special cases and construction of completed years of schooling can be found in Appendix B.1.
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The information state vector St includes: age, marital status and spousal earnings,
number of kids, years of schooling, body mass, years of experience in each of the five occu-
pational categories, and the occupational alternative chosen in the previous period. Known
to the agent, but not the econometrician, are time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity φ and
alternative-specific, idiosyncratic component hjt . At the beginning of period t, the individual
observes his wage offers, which are assumed to arrive with probability one for all alterna-
tives. The chosen alternative in period t determines the evolution of the state variables at
the end of the period (defined here as a year). The individual’s state variables entering
the subsequent period reflect the accumulated work experience or schooling. Body mass,
marital status, and number of kids updated based on stochastic realizations and the period
t decision.
4.2 Per-period Utility and Constraints
The contemporaneous utility of an alternative, hj, is a function of consumption, leisure,
the annual fixed costs of participating in an occupation, variable costs of hours worked, and
any transitional costs of changing occupational categories between periods. In the function
below, ct represents consumption, ht(dt) defines the number of hours worked and/or spent in
school for the set of alternatives, and Mj(·) and Ms(·) are the annual fixed and switching costs
of occupation j and schooling alternative s, respectively. N(ht(·)) represents the variable
costs of working ht hours. Information available to an individual at the start of period t, St,
influences the utility of each alternative. The preference error term in the utility function,
hjt , are assumed to be i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme Value. Per-period utility for each alternative,
conditional on both observed and unobserved information is:
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u(dt,St, t|φ) = c
1−α
t − 1
1− α (3)
−
(∑
j
[
Mj(St|φ)
( 4∑
h=1
dhjt
)]
+Ms(St|φ)
( 6∑
h=4
dhjt
)
+N(ht(dt),St|φ)
)
+ hjt
Consumption is constrained by income, defined as earnings plus discretized unearned spousal
income. Time is constrained by the time endowment per week Ω and is allocated between
labor supply, ht, and leisure, lt. Time spent on education counts as “non-leisure” time in the
model. An agent is assumed to spend 20 hours per week on school if attending part time
and 40 hours per week if attending full time. 16 The budget and time constraints are:
ct ≤ wt(dt,St)ht(dt) + I(St)
Ω = lt + ht(dt)
(4)
where wt and ht are hourly wages and hours that depend on the observed state vector and
the alternative chosen in period t. The It denotes unearned spousal income and Ω represents
the individual’s total amount of time in a given period.
4.3 Non-Monetary Costs: Fixed, Switching, and Variable
The model assumes that individuals receive wage offers from every occupational sector
in each period. However, individuals in the data do not always select into occupations with
the frequency one would expect if individuals solely maximized wealth and there were no
labor demand frictions. To reconcile these differences, the model includes three types of
costs for pursuing employment alternatives. First, the model includes per-period fixed costs
of participating in each occupation that depend on one’s human capital and body mass.
These costs are incurred when an individual works in a given occupation, regardless of the
16If an agent pursues a part-time work, part-time school combination, his total non-leisure time is the sum
of his hours spent working plus the 20 hours per week for part-time schooling.
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number of hours worked. Second, the model includes variable costs of working additional
hours. By allowing individuals to choose how much they work upon receiving a wage offer,
the model captures how the marginal costs of working additional hours vary by weight and
job requirement. Third, the model also includes costs of transitioning into occupation j from
another occupation, j′. Switching costs vary by body mass and age, to capture that older or
heavier workers may incur higher search costs or face additional frictions when transitioning
into a particular occupation.
Fixed costs are a function of age and education, where the vector Et contains three
elements: an indicator for having accrued at least 12 years of school up to period t, an
indicator for having accrued at least 16 years of school up to period t, and completed years
of schooling up to period t. The fixed costs of occupational participation also depend on the
physical, mental, and social requirements of that occupation: Jjt = [J
p
jt, J
m
jt , J
s
jt] respectively,
and φkj , an occupation specific match parameter. Because the levels of job requirements vary
across occupations, the coefficients on the variables for job requirements are fixed across
occupations. Body mass, Bt, captures an individual’s distance from a “healthy weight”.
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The requirements of the occupation are interacted with age and Bt, to capture how body
weight changes the per-period fixed costs of participating in an occupation. These fixed costs
are expressed in the first line of equation 5.
Switching costs are detailed in the second line of equation 5. Switching costs vary by
the occupation the individual worked in in the previous period, age, at, and body weight Bt.
Age and occupation are correlated with body weight and may also affect switching costs.
The variables for age and previous occupation are therefore included to isolate the body
weight specific switching cost for each occupation. The per-period fixed cost, including any
17The Centers for Disease Control define “healthy weight” to be a body mass index that ranges from 18-25.
There are only six individuals in my sample who fall into the “below healthy range” category at any point
during the sample period.
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switching costs, of participating in an occupation j are expressed as:
Mj(St|φ) = αJjt + αJjtat + αJjtBt + αj0 + αj1at + αj2Et + αj5Bt
+
∑
j′ 6=j
αj6+j′1(d
hj′
t−1 = 1) + α
j
111(d
hj
t−1 6= 1)Bt + αj121(dhjt−1 6= 1)at + ρJj φ (5)
The utility costs of schooling depend on age (at), level of schooling, whether the individual
was out of school in the preceding period, and the interaction of age and returning to school.
Ms(St|φ) = αs0Et + αs1
( 6∑
h=4
(dhjt−1 6= 1)
)
+ αs2at + α
s
3a
2
t + α
s
4at
( 6∑
h=4
(dhjt−1 6= 1)
)
+ ρSφ (6)
The individual also incurs variable costs of working more than the minimum threshold of
20 hours. The expression for the variable costs of labor supply, N(ht(dt)) contains many of
the same arguments as the expression for per-period fixed costs, adding interactions with ht
and a φ term to capture heterogeneity in preferences for working additional hours. In the
model, hours pursuing education and work are treated the same, up to the differences in
job requirements. In this expression, mt is a variable for whether the individual is married,
at is the individual’s age at time t, and kt is the number of children the individual has at
time t. The occupational requirements Jjt and the interaction of those requirements with
body weight also affect the cost of working more hours. The variable costs of working are
expressed as: 18
N(ht(dt),St|φ) = ψ1ht + ψ2htmt + ψ3htkt + ψ4htBt + ψ5h2tBt
+ ψ6htJjt + ψ7htJjtBt + ψ8ht[at] + ψ9ht[a
2
t ] + ρ
Nhtφ (7)
Body weight therefore affects both the per-period fixed and variable costs of each
occupation via the requirements of the job. The parameters on these effects are assumed
18Although the variable for hours worked, ht, is treated as continuous, the set of alternatives related to
labor supply is polychotomous. If a specific value of hours is needed for calculation of the value function, I use
25 hours for part-time work, 40 hours for full-time work, and 50 hours for over-time work. For alternatives
that are observed in the data, I use the observed value of ht to calculate N(ht(dt),St).
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common across the occupational categories. Body weight also has occupation-specific effects
on per-period fixed and switching costs.
4.4 Distribution of Wages
The distribution of wages, not just the conditional mean, is meaningful in solution to
the model and estimation of parameters. When an agent makes his employment decision,
he considers how his decision this period affects the distribution from which future wage
offers are drawn. These expectations over future outcomes thusly affect the agent’s decision
today. When estimating the model, calculating choice probabilities requires integration
over the distributions of unobserved wage offers. It is often assumed that wages follow a
continuous distribution (Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Stinebrickner, 2001). Rather than impose
a parametric distribution on an error term and estimate a conditional mean, I estimate the
full density of wages inside the model using Conditional Density Estimation (CDE). I define
the density of wages:
f(wjt|φ) = f(j,St, Bt,Jjt, φ) (8)
where wage is determined by the state vector (St), which includes work experience, edu-
cation, body weight, occupational requirements, and unobserved occupation-specific “skill
endowment”, φ. The coefficients on the interaction of body mass and the vector of job
requirements determine how much of the observed wage differences between individuals of
different weights can be attributed to contemporaneous differences in effectiveness. I control
explicitly for differences in occupational experience and education. Returns to education and
experience are allowed to vary by body weight. The coefficients on body weight alone provide
the best estimate for the contemporaneous “wage penalty” for body weight. Estimation of
the distribution of wages by CDE is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.
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4.4.1 Evolution of Human Capital State Variables
The model allows work experience to accumulate faster for agents who choose to work
more hours. If an individual that works longer hours in a given occupation tends to gain
weight faster than his less career-motivated peers, a failure to keep track of differences in
accrued human capital will lead to bias in the estimation of the costs of body weight. The
state variable xjt denotes “full-time-years of experience” in occupation j entering time t. The
evolution of work experience in each occupation is:
xjt+1 =

xjt if (
∑4
h=1 d
hj
t ) = 0 (no employment in occupation j)
xjt +
1
2
if d1jt = 1 or d
4j
t = 1 (part-time employment in occupation j)
xjt + 1 if d
2j
t = 1 (full-time employment in occupation j)
xjt +
3
2
if d3jt = 1 (over-time employment in occupation j)
(9)
Years of schooling accrue as follows:
edt+1 =

edt if d
hj
t = 1, h = 1, 2, 3, 7 (no schooling)
edt +
1
2
if dhjt = 1, h = 4, 6 (part-time-schooling)
edt + 1 if d
hj
t = 1, h = 5 (full-time schooling)
(10)
4.5 Weight Transition
The model permits employment decisions to affect body weight. Direct effects come
through amount of on-job physical activity (or lack thereof) and number of hours worked.
Food consumption and exercise behavior held constant, lower on-job activity levels equate
to lower caloric expenditure. Due to limitations of the data and the focus of the research
question, this model does not include an agent’s control over food and exercise.19 Neverthe-
less, it is still possible to conduct inference on the indirect effects of employment decisions
on weight. In the model, body weight is conditioned on lagged body weight, food prices,
19Recent work suggests that the omitted variable of endogenous exercise is not that problematic. Colman
and Dave (2011) use ATUS data and find that only 4 percent of total daily calorie expenditure is due to
discretionary exercise, thereby reemphasizing the importance of on-job activity. However, the lack of insight
into individuals’ food choices remains an issue, albeit one which is addressable in part.
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food supply factors, environmental factors, wages, and family states, the requirements of the
occupation selected in that period, and hours worked. The state transition probabilities for
body mass are estimated (and future expectations subsequently taken) using CDE. As with
wages, estimation of the conditional density of body mass without imposing assumptions on
the shape of the distribution. CDE also permits marginal effects to vary over the support of
the distribution of the dependent variable.20 Conditional on body mass Bt in period t, the
density of Bt+1 is:
f(Bt+1|φ) = f(Bt,dt,St,Jjt, XGt , φ) (11)
where the XGt variables include local time-varying food price ratios and crime rates.
4.6 Optimization Problem
The objective of the individual is to choose the alternative at time t to maximize ex-
pected lifetime utility. Lifetime utility at time t is represented by a value function using
the Bellman formulation. The value function is comprised of current period utility and
discounted expected future utility. The total current period utility is the sum of the deter-
ministic utility from equation 3 and an alternative-specific i.i.d. preference shock:
Uhj(d
hj
t = 1,St, φ, t) = Uhj(d
hj
t = 1,St, φ) + 
hj
t (12)
In the empirical implementation, hjt is an additive econometric error (Rust, 1997). In the
theoretical model, hjt is interpreted as an unobserved state variable (Aguirregabiria and Mira,
2010). The alternative specific lifetime value function in state St, conditional on unobserved
20Details are discussed in the next section.
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heterogeneity φ, is:
Vhj(St, 
hj
t |φ) = Uhj(St, φ) + hjt + β
∫
B
f(Bt,dt,St, φ)
1∑
k=0
3∑
m=0
P [Mt+1 = m|St,dt]P [Kt+1 = k|St,dt]E[V(St+1|φ)|dhjt = 1]dB (13)
where V(St+1|φ) is the maximal expected lifetime utility of being in state St+1.21 The value
function is conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity component φ. The expectation oper-
ator is taken over the future wage and preference shocks. I use quadrature with the estimated
conditional density of wages to evaluate the expectation within solution to the model.Let
V hj(·) = Vhj(·)− hjt . Assuming that hjt follows a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution, then
maximal expected lifetime utility has the following closed form expression:
V(St+1|φ) = λ+ ln(
∑
hj
exp(V hj(St+1|φ)), ∀t (14)
where λ is Euler’s constant. Furthermore, because the error term hjt is additively separable,
the conditional choice probabilities take the following form:
p(dhjt = 1|St, φ) =
exp(V hj(St|φ)∑
hj′ exp(V hj′(St|φ)
(15)
The likelihood function consists of these choice probabilities, augmented to take expectations
over unobserved wages as in Stinebrickner (2001), and transition probabilities for marriage,
body mass, and number of children.
21The model includes marriage, spousal earnings, and number of children in the state vector. These
variables are not treated as choices, but the individuals’ employment decisions affect transition probabilities.
Details on these state variables are available in Appendix A.
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5 Empirical Implementation
Several features of the model are emphasized in the following discussion of the esti-
mation of the theoretical model. This section concludes with a discussion of identification.
Details on initial conditions and construction of the likelihood function are available in Ap-
pendix A.
5.1 Conditional Density Estimation
Rather than impose a parametric distribution on (log) wages and body mass, I semi-
parametrically estimate the full conditional density of (level) wages and body mass inside
the model. Estimating the conditional density utilizes a sequence of conditional probabilities
to construct a discrete approximation to the density function of the outcome of interest,
conditional on the explanatory variables. As in Gilleskie and Mroz (2004), these conditional
probabilities used in the sequences are logistic.
Recent work using nonparametric methods (Kline and Tobias, 2008) and quantile meth-
ods (Johar and Katayama, 2012) has shown that the effects of weight on wages varies over
the distribution of wages. CDE also permits explanatory variables to have different marginal
effects at different points of support of the dependent variable. By employing CDE, we can
examine how the marginal effect of interacted variables (e.g., the how body weight affects
returns to experience) vary over the support of the distribution of wages. In the weight
transition expression, we can similarly evaluate how the marginal effect of at work physi-
cal activity varies over the support of body weight. Gilleskie and Mroz (2004) show that
expected wages can be approximated using the estimated density:
E[wt|St,Jjt, φ] =
K∑
k=1
wt(k|K) · P [wk−1 ≤ wt < wk|St,Jjt, φ] (16)
where P [wk−1 ≤ wt < wk|St,Jjt, φ] = λW (k,St,Jjt, φ)
∏k−1
j=1 [1 − λW (j,St,Jjt, φ)], λ(k,X) is
a single logit hazard equation, and w(k|K) is the arithmetic mean of the wages observed in
21
partition k. In solution to the model, expectations can be taken using this discrete estimated
approximation rather than integrating over a continuously distributed error term. Similarly,
the expectations and transition probabilities for body mass are:22
E[Bt+1|St,dt, φ] =
L∑
l=1
Bt+1(l|L) · P [Bl−1 ≤ Bt+1 < Bl|St,dt, pFt , XGt , φ] (17)
where P [Bl−1 ≤ Bt+1 < Bl|St,dt, pFt , XGt , φ] = λ(l,St,dt, pFt , XGt , φ)
∏l−1
j=1[1−λ(j,St,dt, pFt , XGt , φ)]
5.2 Indices of Job Requirements by Occupation
One contribution of this paper is the attribution of weight-based differences in employ-
ment costs and wages to the physical, mental, and social requirements for the occupations.
The raw data for requirements for jobs come from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
and its present day counterpart, O*NET, the Occupational Information Network. The DOT
contains information on over 12,000 jobs, many of which could be better characterized as
tasks than positions for which an individual is solely hired. Aggregating these jobs up to
five occupational classes is done in two steps. First, DOT jobs are crosswalked to Census
Occupation Codes. The COC levels for job requirements are calculated by taking an un-
weighted average of the DOT ratings.23 Second, CPS weights were used to aggregate the
COC averages up to the Occupation-class-level values. Intrinsic variation in requirement
values come from changes in the both from changes in reported values in DOT and O*NET
revisions and from addition/subtraction of jobs between revisions. Extrinsic variation in
requirement values comes from the variation in CPS weights as the distribution of jobs in a
given occupation changes over time (e.g., computer systems analysts are much more heav-
ily weighted in 2006 than 1980). Details on mapping the fine O*NET data into the coarser
DOT are available in Appendix B.5. Conditional on the assumptions used for this crosswalk,
22K and L are the number of quantiles into which the data for wages and weight are divided. Here, 25
was used for both K and L.
23The O*NET reports at the COC level.
22
variation in predicted DOT ratings based on O*NET data can be interpreted as changes in
job requirements. Graphs of the calculated job indices by occupation from 1977-2006 are
also available in the appendix.
5.3 Permanent Unobserved Heterogeneity
The empirical model permits correlation in permanent unobserved heterogeneity in the
error terms in the expressions for wages for each occupation, fixed costs for each occupation
(including school), the weight transition, and taste for working additional hours. Perma-
nent unobserved heterogeneity enters the model through the φ terms and associated factor
loadings (ρ). The factor loadings allow for a different effect of the unobserved φ in each ex-
pression. Rather than impose a distribution on the unobserved heterogeneity, I approximate
that joint distribution with a step function, estimating the factor loadings, mass points, and
mixing weights, pi (Heckman and Singer, 1984). The discrete factor random effects method
performs well in approximating both normal and non-normal distributions (Mroz, 1999).
5.4 Weight Inference
The research question is not why people gain weight. The model includes stochastic
weight transitions that might be directly and indirectly influenced by schooling, employ-
ment, occupation, and hours decisions to capture whether employment decisions affect body
weight over the life cycle. Ignoring the possibility of this dynamic feedback mechanism (i.e.
that occupations may affect body mass) would introduce bias to the estimates of how weight
affects employment behavior. The data limitation is that the NLSY does not provide in-
formation on caloric intake and caloric expenditure. As such, the structural production of
body mass (as a function of these inputs) cannot be modeled. Instead, the joint demands for
caloric intake and expenditure are replaced by their theoretical arguments. The parameters
in the weight transition expression (equations (11) and (17)) are therefore functions of struc-
tural parameters rather than structural parameters. By controlling for environmental factors
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such as food prices and crime rates, it is possible to control for factors that may magnify
or reduce the unobservable indirect effects of employment behavior on weight via lifestyle
choices. For example, supplying additional labor provides more money for (un)healthy food
but leaves less time available for all forms of leisure, including exercise. Supplying additional
labor may also encourage or necessitate agents to substitute towards restaurant meals or fast
food (forsaking grocery/meal preparation time for leisure), both of which tend to be heavy
in calories. During the sample period there has been a dramatic increase in the supply of
“convenience food”, habitual consumption of which leads to weight gain. Variation in these
environmental factors and weight gain patterns informs us about how employment decisions
probabilistically affect unobserved decisions regarding food and exercise.
5.5 Identification
For the identification of the model parameters, the contemporaneous utility of not
working with no unearned spousal income is normalized to zero, as is the switching cost
of transitioning to unemployment. The vector of job requirements when not working is
normalized to zero. The identification of the parameters in the contemporaneous utility
function are all identified through choice frequencies, conditional on observed wages. The
identification of the parameters in the fixed-cost expression comes from the frequency with
which individuals at various points in the state space (and their observed wage offers) choose
various occupations relative to not working. The coefficients on the job characteristics Jjt
are identified by the variation in frequency of occupational choice as job requirements evolve.
Note these requirements vary over occupation and time. The parameters for variable cost of
working additional hours are identified by the frequency that individuals choose alternatives
with part, full, or overtime hours, conditional on observed wage offers and job requirements.
The exponent in the utility function is identified through changes in the response of hours
worked, ht, to variation in wages as unearned spousal income changes. The pursuit of
education early in the model also aids in the identification of the CRRA parameter as it will
24
pick up inter-temporal elasticity of substitution with regards to consumption. If the CRRA
coefficient is close to zero, the value of an additional year of education (and higher expected
lifetime earnings) is greater than if the CRRA coefficient is larger.
6 Results
6.1 Wages
Tables 12 and 13 in Appendix A.4 contain parameter results from the conditional
density estimation of wages and a discussion about how to interpret these hazard function
parameters. Interpreting parameter results directly as marginal effects is infeasible. Marginal
effects must be calculated by simulation. Calculated marginal effects for the variables of
interest (Bt and Bt interacted with job requirements, education, and experience) are reported
in tables 5 and 6.
Recall that Bt is the distance between an individual’s BMI and the ‘healthy weight’
boundary of 25. The right column in table 5 shows that higher body weight leads to lower
wages in mentally and socially intensive occupations. The relationship between body mass
and wages in physically intensive occupations is positive. In all three requirements, however,
the point estimates of the interaction effect of BMI and the requirement are greatest in the
upper quartile of the distribution of wages. Because job requirements vary by occupation
and time, the marginal effects of BtJjt do not vary by occupation.
Table 6 contains the occupation specific marginal effects of body weight on wages.
Conditional on requirements, higher body weight is linked to lower wages in Sales and Admin-
istrative Occupations and Professional, Technical and Managerial occupations. The largest
effects are again found in the upper quartile of the wage distribution. In all occupations,
BMI has a negative effect in the upper quartile, although in the Blue collar and service
occupations, observations in the upper quartile are far less common. Higher body mass is
25
also linked to lower returns to ’white collar’ experience in nearly all occupations.24 Fourth,
higher body mass reduces returns to education in white collar occupations. The greatest
effects again occur in the top quartile.
While the marginal effects ofBt and BtJjt on wages are meant to capture the weight-
based wage penalty and wage differential attributed to productivity, respectively, they must
be interpreted with caution. There may be productivity differences that these indices do not
capture. Additionally, the possibility of factors such as persistence in statistical discrimina-
tion prevents me from attributing the lower returns to experience in white-collar occupations
to productivity (Lehmann, 2013).
In summary, individuals of high body mass earn lower wages, lower returns to educa-
tion and experience in white collar occupations, and lower wages in socially intensive jobs.
All of these results are largest in the upper quartile of wages. While larger absolute values
of wages will create larger absolute differences in wages between any two groups, the dif-
ference in wages on the basis of body weight is far greater at the mean than the median.
Overall, the results indicate that heavier individuals are much less likely to be observed in
the upper portions of the wage distribution in white collar occupations. This prediction
fits the data. While our best estimates for contemporaneous weight-based wage penalties
are relatively small, the lower returns to experience, education, negative marginal effects of
social requirements and body weight jointly indicate that body weight is an impediment to
career advancement.
6.2 Fixed, Variable, and Switching Costs
Tables 7 and 8 report the estimated cost parameters, including fixed costs of participat-
ing in each occupation and schooling, switching costs, and variable costs. The results suggest
that heavier individuals face lower fixed costs of participating in occupations with greater
physical and mental requirements, and higher fixed costs of participating in occupations
24“White Collar” occupations include Professional, Technical, and Managerial Occupations (category 1)
and Sales and Administrative Occupations (category 2).
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Table 5: Marginal Effects of Job Requirements on Wages
Occupation-Invariant Effects
Requirement Quartile Effect Requirement Quartile Effect
*BMI
Physical Lower 46.52 Physical Lower 1.09
Inter 125.86 Inter 9.29
Upper 153.84 Upper 18.85
Mental Lower -2.85 Mental Lower -0.46
Inter 5.01 Inter -2.31
Upper 18.57 Upper -1.75
Social Lower -16.26 Social Lower -1.15
Inter 8.66 Inter -2.05
Upper 48.06 Upper -5.86
Values are in 1983 cents
Table 6: Occupation-Specific Marginal Effects - BMI and Interactions
Professional Sales/Admin Craftsmen Laborers Service
Variable Quartile Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
BMI Lower -8.56 -2.34 9.06 6.02 5.05
Inter -13.56 -6.78 0.44 -3.23 -8.27
Upper -14.07 -11.09 -12.03 -4.46 -15.05
BMI × Lower -0.53 1.11 2.85 -1.40 4.36
Education Inter -0.60 -2.15 4.68 6.00 4.95
(Year) Upper -1.60 -3.52 3.68 5.12 3.38
BMI × Lower -28.78 -4.84 0.9 14.50 -8.52
Bachelor’s Degree Inter -21.92 -17.49 -15.07 13.56 -1.09
Upper -24.91 -22.4 -10.64 -18.48 2.36
BMI × Lower -0.15 4.46 1.10 -1.54 -5.19
Experience Occ.1 Inter -0.70 -1.64 -0.49 -5.36 -2.61
Upper -3.46 -6.15 -1.49 -6.36 2.39
BMI × Lower 0.56 3.19 2.48 -2.90 -4.06
Experience Occ.2 Inter -1.59 -2.96 0.52 -1.81 -0.75
Upper -3.65 -5.32 -0.68 -0.81 -0.96
BMI × Lower 0.18 3.29 1.19 0.69 1.42
Experience Occ.3 Inter -2.68 4.56 0.43 0.78 3.27
Upper -1.60 0.10 0.57 0.98 36.64
BMI × Lower 0.30 1.56 0.43 0.72 0.24
Experience Occ.4 Inter 1.80 -1.42 0.99 0.47 0.58
Upper -0.76 1.26 0.65 0.07 0.99
BMI × Lower 2.14 2.95 1.04 0.02 2.28
Experience Occ.5 Inter 2.75 -4.97 -3.03 -1.78 0.30
Upper 1.94 -8.79 -2.00 -3.03 -1.70
Values are in 1983 cents
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that have greater social requirements. Linking with the wage results, heavier individuals
face lower wages and higher fixed costs in socially intensive jobs while the opposite is true
for physically intensive jobs.
Conditional on the requirements of the job, heavier individuals are found to face higher
fixed costs of working in Professional, Technical, and Manager (PTM); Sales, Clerical, and
Administrative (SCA), and Craftsmen occupations. Heavier individuals face lower fixed costs
of working in Laborer occupations. Since nearly all customer facing jobs are found in the Sales
and Administrative category, this result is not inconsistent with a beauty effect (Hamermesh
and Biddle, 1994). The results also suggest that greater body mass leads to higher switching
costs when entering white collar jobs, which are also the most socially intensive. The effects
are twice as strong for PTM occupations ($6,500 at the mean wage) as SCA jobs ($2,700).
Results therefore suggest that body mass affects occupational attainment, which in turn
affects future experience and future wage distributions. This relationship is further explored
in Section 7.
6.3 Weight Transition
The parameter estimates for the body mass transition equation are reported in Table
9. Similar to the results for wages, the marginal effects require additional interpretation.25
Conditional on body mass entering the period, higher wages are associated with lower body
mass in the following period for individuals with a BMI less than 28, but increasing body
mass for those with a BMI greater than 28. The result for the relatively fit people is
consistent with the notion that higher wages garner more resources for investment in health
capital (Grossman, 1972). However, the interaction effect of body mass and wages is positive,
implying that individuals of higher body mass may use those additional resources on less
healthy goods. The estimates for hours exhibit a similar pattern. While an increase in hours
worked leads to lower body mass in the ensuing period, the interaction effect of body mass
25See Appendix A.4 for notes on interpretation.
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Table 7: Utility Function Parameters
Variable Estimate ASE
α 0.5948 0.070
Occupation-Invariant Variable Costs Fixed Costs of Schooling
Variable Estimate ASE Variable Estimate ASE
Constant ***-0.823 0.007 Constant ***1.109 0.082
Mt ***-0.237 0.008 (Ed ≥ 12) *** 0.373 0.010
Kt ***-0.018 0.002 (Ed ≥ 16) **0.902 0.001
Bt ***0.018 0.001 t ***0.306 0.010
hours*Bt ***0.042 0.001 t
2 **-0.098 0.038
Physical ***-0.647 0.008 Working ***0.007 0.000
Mental ***-0.345 0.003 Returning ***0.166 0.003
Social ***0.005 0.001
Physical*Bt *** -0.007 0.001
Mental*Bt *** -0.009 0.001
Social*Bt **0.003 0.001
t - 0.002 0.001
hours*t 0.002 0.001
hours ***0.452 0.002
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Factor Loading -0.533 0.009 Factor Loading 0.202 0.006
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Table 9: Parameter Estimates for Body Mass Density
Variable Estimate ASE Variable Estimate ASE
Constant ***12.720 0.229 Physical **0.138 0.051
γ ***-8.840 0.146 Physical*γ ***0.072 0.022
γ2 ***2.173 0.035 Mental -0.013 0.141
γ3 ***0.9953 0.009 Mental*γ -0.008 0.006
t ***0.023 0.007 Kt 0.016 0.028
t*γ ***0.029 0.003 Kt*γ -0.002 0.012
t2/100 **-0.043 0.021 Spouse Inc. (1000’s) -0.002 0.005
(t2/100)*γ ***-0.076 0.009 Spouse Inc.*γ 0.001 0.002
Body mass ***-0.354 0.006 (hours/10)*Bt ***-0.167 0.031
Body mass*γ ***0.421 0.005 (hours/10)*Bt*γ ***0.059 0.009
(Ed ≥ 12) 0.103 0.091 wage ***1.035 0.045
(Ed ≥ 12)*γ 0.016 0.038 wage*γ 0.018 0.015
(Ed ≥ 16) -0.070 0.055 wage*(hours/10) ***0.009 0.002
(Ed ≥ 16)*γ ***-0.075 0.022 wage*(hours/10)*γ ***0.004 0.001
Married *0.099 0.055 wage*Body mass ***-0.324 0.014
Married*γ **0.56 0.025 wage* Body mass*γ ***-0.036 0.005
hours/10 ***0.621 0.103 FF Index ***-0.017 0.004
(hours/10)*γ *-0.040 0.024 FF Index*γ **-0.005 0.002
hours2/100 -0.001 0.006 Crime Index **-0.143 0.056
(hours2/100)*γ -0.002 0.003 Crime Index*γ 0.002 0.006
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Factor Loading 0.202 0.045
and hours is positive. The education dummies corresponding to high school and college
graduation are associated with lower body mass.
Conditional on education, income, unobserved heterogeneity, and age; physically in-
tensive jobs are shown to increase body mass at the low end of the distribution, but have a
negative effect on body mass in the upper portion of the distribution. As the index for phys-
ical requirements is primarily based on strength, it is logical that slightly-built individuals
might gain some muscle mass. It also follows that very heavy individuals will be most likely
to experience weight loss in response to an increase in physical exertion. The parameters on
mentally intensive work are not statistically significant.
6.4 Model Fit
To assess how well the model fits the observed data, I simulate employment decisions
and wages using the model and the estimated parameters for 10,000 individuals. Initial
conditions are randomly drawn using observed frequencies in the data and the estimated
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Figure 1: Percentage of Individuals Choosing Each Occupation by Age, Model v. Data
parameters of the model. Details are available in Appendix A. An individual’s “type” is
also drawn randomly using proportions from the estimated distribution of unobserved het-
erogeneity. Figure 1 shows the predicted proportions of chosen occupations by age and the
same proportions from the observed data.
Figure 2 plots the observed and predicted proportions of occupations chosen for the
obese and non-obese by specific age groups. The model predicts the relative differences be-
tween the obese and non-obese well. In each age group in the data, obese workers are less
likely to be found in professional occupations than non-obese workers. When workers are
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under the age of 30, obese workers are less likely to be found in sales and administrative
occupations than non-obese workers. The opposite is true in later years. The model predicts
both the levels of and differences between obese and non-obese workers sorting into crafts-
men, laborer, and service occupations. The model mispredicts weight-based differences in
occupational choice in three ways: the model over predicts selection into Craftsmen occupa-
tions, the model over predicts the selection of obese workers into Laborer jobs, and under
predicts the selection of obese workers into service occupations.
Figure 3 plots the observed and predicted wages for the obese and non-obese by age for
each occupational category. In the white collar occupations where growth in wage disparity
on the basis of weight is common, the model captures the growth in wages for both weight
groups. In the observed data from professional occupations, obese workers make $0.84 per
hour (in 1983 dollars) less than their non-obese counterparts at age 25, and $4.27 less than
non-obese workers at age 45. The model predicts these differences to be $0.67 and $4.42 at
ages 25 and 45 respectively. The model also predicts the growth in the difference in mean
wages as individuals age for Sales, Clerical, and Administrative Occupations. In the data,
obese workers earn $1.42 per hour less than their non-obese counterparts at age 25, and
$3.71 less at age 45. The model predicts these differences to be $1.39 and $4.10 respectively.
As seen in Figure 3, the model not only predicts the end points fairly well, but also predicts
the trends in between. The model also predicts wages by weight status for blue collar
occupations, and predicts non-disparities in blue collar occupations, and stable disparity in
service occupations. Note that the scaling is smaller in the bottom three panels of Figure 3
as mean wages in these occupations were lower in both initial values and growth rates over
the sample period. In all occupations, the model over predicts wages for non-obese workers
for the last 2-4 years.
Table 10 contains the observed and predicted transition matrices for obese and non-
obese individuals. The model under predicts persistence in unemployment for obese workers,
over predicts persistence in sales/administrative occupations, over predicts the transition of
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Figure 2: Predicted and Observed Proportions of Occ’s, Obese and Non-Obese
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Figure 3: Predicted and Observed Differences in Wages Between the Obese and Non-Obese
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obese workers from unemployment to laborer work, and under-predicts the transition from
unemployment to professional work. However, as the model over predicts the selection of
obese workers into sales/administrative occupations laborer occupations, this final result is
not surprising.
7 Simulations
Having shown that the estimated model fits the key stylized facts of the observed data,
I conduct a few simulations using the specified model and estimated parameters to illustrate
the dynamic effects of body weight on employment decisions and wages over the life cycle.
I first construct a simulated sample of 10,000 individuals that reflects the distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions for years of schooling body mass. I then
simulate wage offers, employment decisions and weight gain from age seventeen onward.
While the previous section treated the effects of body weight on employment decisions as
separate, they are interrelated. The non-monetary costs of employment affect employment
decisions and subsequent wages. Wage differentials affect employment decision and outcomes.
These simulations serve to show how these different costs and factors work in concert. As
this is a partial equilibrium model, all of these effects should be interpreted in the context
of the individual worker rather than the population.
The first simulation supposes individuals no longer incur any additional switching costs
due to their body weight and evaluates how this increased occupational mobility will affect
employment choices and wages. The results are displayed in Figure 4. Since the white collar
occupations were the only ones estimated to have substantial entry frictions due to body
mass, these occupations are the focus of this simulation. Figure 4 shows that in the absence
of weight-specific switching costs, the probabilistic gap in choosing Professional, Technical,
and Managerial occupations shrinks by approximately 20 percent. The top left panel shows
the percent gap in attainment for non-obese and obese workers as predicted by the model
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Table 10: Occupational Transitional Matrix
Non-Obese Individuals: t− 1 in rows, t in columns
No Work PTM Sales/Admin Craftsmen Ops/Labor Service Total
No Work 69.55 8.81 4.11 5.22 8.58 3.72 100.00
(Model) 70.01 7.49 3.63 4.98 8.31 5.57 100.00
PTM 4.56 83.27 4.63 3.78 2.31 1.46 100.00
(Model) 2.68 84.15 3.95 4.18 3.73 1.32 100.00
Sales Admin 5.29 16.84 65.78 3.30 7.31 1.48 100.00
(Model) 5.17 12.59 67.03 3.40 8.17 3.65 100.00
Craftsmen 4.14 7.27 1.90 72.95 12.26 1.39 100.00
(Model) 4.95 6.72 2.22 76.29 8.69 1.13 100.00
Ops/Labor 6.14 4.42 4.49 12.75 68.90 3.29 100.00
(Model) 5.09 5.83 4.68 10.52 70.58 3.29 100.00
Service 8.66 7.59 2.83 5.61 10.69 64.62 100.00
(Model) 5.66 6.02 5.09 7.42 8.62 67.17 100.00
Total 20.40 28.89 9.58 17.09 18.07 5.98 100.00
(Model) 17.55 27.72 10.28 18.12 18.71 7.62 100.00
Obese Individuals: t− 1 in rows, t in columns
No Work PTM Sales/Admin Craftsmen Ops/Labor Service Total
No Work 67.76 11.70 3.57 5.99 6.99 3.99 100.00
(Model) 60.31 8.64 3.88 8.18 13.48 5.51 100.00
PTM 3.84 86.84 3.50 3.61 1.41 0.79 100.00
(Model) 2.07 87.40 2.43 3.90 3.37 0.83 100.00
Sales Admin 4.56 11.50 70.99 4.56 6.20 2.19 100.00
(Model) 2.91 9.10 78.19 2.40 5.84 1.58 100.00
Craftsmen 2.28 5.59 1.97 80.24 8.35 1.57 100.00
(Model) 3.51 4.30 1.41 83.34 6.58 0.86 100.00
Ops/Labor 4.44 3.06 3.45 10.26 75.64 3.16 100.00
(Model) 3.29 3.80 3.10 6.81 81.17 1.83 100.00
Service 5.75 4.20 3.10 1.77 5.97 79.20 100.00
(Model) 3.19 3.40 2.70 4.99 6.10 79.62 100.00
Total 11.61 31.34 9.56 21.92 17.49 8.06 100.00
(Model) 7.34 27.23 11.85 22.68 23.93 7.29 100.00
Source: NLSY ’79
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Figure 4: Counterfactual Results - Elimination of Body Mass Specific Switching Costs
and the hypothetical simulation. The model predicts that an obese worker is 25 percent
less likely than a non-obese worker to choose employment in a professional occupation in his
early thirties. Without weight specific switching costs, an obese male is only 15 percent less
likely to be employed in a professional occupation by age 35. The sharpest reduction in the
attainment gap occurs between ages 30 and 35, when careers are advancing.
The upper panel on the right side shows the effects of the hypothetical policy on
weight-based differences in attaining work in sales, clerical, and administrative occupations.
Without weight-specific switching costs, an obese worker is 10 percent more likely than
a non-obese worker to choose a sales and administrative occupation after age 30. These
occupations are high paying relative to laborer and service occupations, and have lower
social requirements than the professional occupations. The third panel in Figure 4 shows
the growth of the difference in mean real wages between obese and non-obese workers as
predicted by the baseline model and the counterfactual simulation. If an obese individual
experienced no weight-specific barriers to occupational mobility, the expected wage gap
between an obese worker and non-obese worker would decrease by an average of12 percent
over the sample period.
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The second simulation examines the effects of a one-time exogenous mid-career shock to
an individual’s body weight. Baseline predictions were formed by simulating the model using
the estimated parameters and the observed data. I again predicted occupational choices and
wages using the estimated parameters of the model, but reduced the individual’s Body Mass
Index by one weight class (5 points) at age 35.26 The results are displayed below in Figure 5.
The initial change in wages is small (< 4 percent), which is consistent with prior literature
that has found no direct wage penalties’ for body weight. However, by age 45, an individual
who lost a weight class at age 35 is expected to earn 10 percent more than an individual
who did not.
This increase is driven by both a predicted increase in the probability of attaining a
white collar occupation after the shock (see top panels), and increases in expected wages in
those occupations. The model predicts that such an exogenous shock would increase wages
by approximately $1.54 in professional occupations and $.1.37 in sales and administrative
occupations. The individual is 4 percent more likely to attain work in a professional occu-
pation, and as much as 10 percent more likely to be employed in a sales or administrative
job. Weight loss does not substantially affect the distribution of wage offers in either blue
collar or service occupational category.
I also simulate the effects of an early career exogenous change in an individual’s initial
body weight on their life cycle occupational choices and wages. I decreased the individual’s
initial body mass by 20 percent (approximately one weight class) in one simulation, and
increased the individual’s initial body mass by 20 percent in the other. Figure 6 contains the
results. When an individual’s initial body weight was reduced, he was 5 percent more likely
to gain employment in professional occupations in his 20’s and 30’s, relative to the original
prediction. Raising initial body mass had a stronger effect. Simulating the model with a 20
percent increase in initial body mass, an individual is 15 percent less likely to choose PTM
occupations and 10-15 percent more likely to select either blue collar occupation (Craftsmen
26For a five foot eight inch male, this is the equivalent of losing 25 pounds. For a 6 foot tall Male, this
equates to losing 29 pounds.
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Figure 5: Counterfactual Results - Exogenous 5-point Loss of Body Mass at Age 35
or Laborer).27 The final panel in figure 6 shows that overall, a 20 percent increase/decrease
in initial BMI leads to a 10 percent decrease/5 percent increase in real wages over the life
course.
Finally, I conduct simulations with certain aspects of the wage distribution held fixed
to ascertain what ’shares’ of the observed growth in wage differences on the basis of weight
are attributable to changes in job requirements, unobserved heterogeneity, and the com-
pounding effects of lower wages earned individuals of higher body weight. Graphs of the
expected difference in wages for an obese and non-obese worker as predicted under baseline
and counterfactual conditions are exhibited in figure 7. Unobserved heterogeneity is shown
to be important as the top right panel shows that the wage gap shrinks by approximately
40-50 percent when the model is simulated without heterogeneity. The top left panel shows
27The effects on occupational attainment for SCA jobs were not definitive.
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Figure 6: Counterfactual - Exogenous 20 percent Decrease and 20 percent Increase in Initial
BMI
Figure 7: Differences in Mean Wages Under Counterfactual Conditions
41
that changes in job requirements account for 10-20 percent the observed growth in wage
differences between obese and non-obese workers.
The bottom two panels contain simulated wage differences in the two white-collar
occupational categories from the model under baseline conditions and with the parameters
in the wage distribution on body weight and body weight interacted with education set to
zero. While we have found that contemporaneous wage penalties for obesity are relatively
small, the compounding effect of residual weight-based wage differentials and differences in
returns to education are substantial. These “wage penalties” for obesity account for roughly
25 percent of the wage gap between obese and non-obese workers. To evaluate the impact of
differences in experience between the weight classes, I used the estimates for the parameters
of the wage distribution to evaluate the difference in wages between the obese and non-obese
workers if the obese workers were arbitrarily assigned the experience profiles of non-obese
workers. I found that this reduced the mean difference in wages between obese and non-obese
workers by 9 percent and 6 percent for the professional and clerical occupations respectively.
8 Discussion
This study formulates and estimates a dynamic stochastic model of employment de-
cisions and wages over the life cycle to determine the composite effect of body weight on
labor market outcomes. Where previous work has focused on attributing weight-based dif-
ferentials to discrimination, productivity, or other motivations; this paper focuses on the
manifestation of monetary and non-monetary costs of body weight and how those costs can
compound over the life cycle. Body weight is found to decrease occupational mobility, lower
returns to white-collar occupational experience, and lower the returns to education in white
collar occupations. Body weight leads to lower wages and higher non-monetary costs in
jobs with greater social requirements, but the opposite is true in jobs with intense physical
requirements.
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Previous work in literature (e.g., Cawley (2004)) has found that wage penalties for
obesity are small in white males. While our results are consistent with that finding, I
also find that high body weight nevertheless presents significant costs to workers. The joint
finding that body weight reduces returns to experience, reduces returns to education, reduces
occupational mobility into professional and managerial jobs is consistent with higher body
weight being an impediment to career development. This is especially true, given that the
wage effects are particularly strong in upper quantiles of distribution of wages. While this
study focused on occupational choice, a separate examination that linked body weight to
the probability of receiving promotions could validate or debunk this mechanism.
From the results and simulations, two results are troubling. First, although contempo-
raneous wage penalties for body weight are small, higher body weight is shown to decrease
earnings and occupational mobility over the life cycle. Second, as evidenced by the sim-
ulation where job requirements are held fixed at 1977 levels, the ongoing transition to a
service-based economy is not good news for heavier people. Given that the generation en-
tering the workforce in the U.S. is the heaviest yet, these results have negative implications
for future average productivity of labor. Further, the number of blue collar jobs that favor
heavier workers is shrinking. These results of this model imply that income inequality on
the basis of body weight will likely continue to worsen. While this paper does not posit a
policy-based solution, the findings certainly raise the stakes for prevention and remediation
of adolescent obesity. While the adverse health effects of high body weight are well doc-
umented, rates of overweight and obesity continue to increase. Perhaps knowledge of how
body weight affects career decisions can influence healthy behavior. If individuals do not
respond to health incentives, maybe they will respond to monetary incentives.
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A Technical Appendix
A.1 Solution and the Likelihood Function
In a finite horizon maximization problem, at any given time t, I model an individual’s
decision making behavior as if he is maximizing his expected discounted utility over the
balance of his lifetime, conditional on the current state. Three aspects of the data must be
addressed in estimation. First, the lives of agents continue past the horizon of the data,
and agents will continue to receive utility beyond the observed periods. To capture this
unobserved continuation payoff, this model uses a closing function as in Mroz and Weir
(2003) to approximate the unobserved future utility as a linear function of state variables
including experience, body mass, and indicators for occupation in the final period. The
parameters of this linear function g(·) are estimated jointly within the model. The final
period closing function is
V̂ (ST |φ) = g(ST |φ) (18)
With this approximation for the closing function, the value of a specific alternative in time
T − 1, as in equation (15) conditional on type and observed wage offer ωjT−1, is
V hjT−1(ST−1|φ, ωjT−1) = Uhj(ST−1, ωjT−1, φ) + βEV̂ (ST |ST−1,dT−1, φ) (19)
I proceed by backward recursion to solve for value functions in preceding periods.
Second, I must account for the fact that individuals’ wage offers in each occupation are
not observed when those occupations are not chosen. As in Stinebrickner (2001), I integrate
over the distribution of unobserved wages when calculating the conditional choice probability
in equation (17). Defining ω−j as the vector of unobserved wage offers, the choice probability
conditional on state St and wage offer ωj is:
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p(dhjt = 1|St, ωjt , φ) =
∫
ω−j
exp(V hj(St|ωj, φ)∑
hj′ exp(V hj′(St|ωj′ , φ)
P [wk−1 ≤ ωjt < wk|St] dω−j (20)
which does not have a closed form solution. Integration is conducted by taking D Halton
draws from the joint distribution of unobserved wages as estimated by CDE. Equation (22)
can thus be rewritten as:28
P (dhjt = 1, ω
j
t |St, φ) =
1
D
D∑
d=1
exp(V hj(St|ωjt , φ))∑
hj′ exp(V hj′(St|ωj
′(d)
t , φ))
P [wk−1 ≤ ωjt < wk|St] (21)
Finally, the likelihood function accounts for the switching of the NLSY ’79 from an annual
to a biennial survey in 1994. While data on employment behavior, wages, and family status
for the missing years can be recovered from the retrospective questions, I integrate over
body mass in the odd numbered years. Because body mass as a state variable enters the
conditional choice probabilities and transition probabilities for marriage state and number
of children, integration is required when calculating these probabilities. For exposition, I
define the variable yt as follows:
yt =

0 if year is during annual survey period (up to 1994)
1 if year is during biennial survey period and is a survey year
2 if year is during biennial survey period and is not a survey year
(22)
Let Gy=0t |φ be the individual’s likelihood contribution in period t when yt = 0 and conditional
on unobserved heterogeneity term φ, suppressing notation for St,dt, and φ as (·), where
28D=80
50
Gy=0t |φ =
HJ∏
hj=1
[
P˜ (dhjt = 1, ω
j
t |·)∗
L∏
l=1
(PBt |·)1[Bt+1=Bl]∗
3∏
m′=0
(PMt |·)1[Mt+1=m
′]∗
1∏
k=0
(P kt |·)1[Kt+1=Kt+k]
](dhjti )
(23)
The choice probability, conditional on observed wage, is defined as above, PBt is the CDE
weight transition probability, PMt and P
K
t the transition probabilities for marriage and chil-
dren from equations (11) and (12) respectively. In survey years during the biennial period,
the individual’s contribution is similar except body mass transition probabilities are not
calculated as body mass will not be observed in the next period. Therefore when yt = 1:
Gy=1t |φ =
HJ∏
hj=1
[
P˜ (dhjt = 1, ω
j
t |·) ∗
3∏
m′=0
(PMt |·)1[Mt+1=m
′] ∗
1∏
k=0
(P kt |·)1[Kt+1=Kt+k]
](dhjti )
(24)
and when yt = 2, I use the parameters of the model to integrate over the missing body mass
state variable when calculating all four probabilities:
Gy=2t |φ =
B∑
b=1
PBt−1
(
HJ∏
hj=1
[
P˜ (dhjt = 1, ω
j
t |·, Bt = b) ∗
L∏
l=1
(PBt |·, Bt = b)1[Bt+1=Bl]
∗
3∏
m′=0
(PMt |·, Bt = b)1[Mt+1=m
′] ∗
1∏
k=0
(P kt |·, Bt = b)1[Kt+1=Kt+k]
](dhjti ))
(25)
where the cell means from the body mass CDE are used for the discrete missing values of
Bt. To complete the likelihood function I need initial conditions as discussed above. With
initial condition probabilities in place, an individual’s contribution to likelihood function to
estimate the above, conditional on φ is:
Li(Θ|φk) =
Ti∏
t=1
[ 2∏
y′=0
(
Gy
′
t |φ
)1[y=y′]]
(26)
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The unconditional likelihood function for an individual can then be written as
Li(Θ) =
∑
k
pikLi(Θ|φk) (27)
The likelihood function is therefore:
Li(Θ) =
N∏
i=1
∑
k
pikLi(Θ|φk) (28)
A.2 Initial Conditions
In the model, agents are assumed to make their first schooling/employment choice at
age 17. At age 17, agents are assumed to have no accrued occupational experience.29 The
endogenous state variables of years of completed schooling and initial body mass require the
modeling of initial conditions. The initial condition for completed years of schooling is mod-
eled using an ordered probit regression with birth quarter and information about presence
of newspapers, magazines, and library cards as exclusion restrictions. Initial conditions for
body mass are modeled using regional dummies, information about parents’ health, and the
same time-varying environmental factors (linked with the geocoded data) from the weight
equation. The NLSY began recording weight in 1981. For the significant portion of the
sample who was older than 17 by 1981, I use the results of the 17 year olds whose weight
I do observe in 1981 to estimate the conditional distribution of the age-17 weights of the
individuals who were 17 prior to 1981. Using the model, I can simulate weights (probabilis-
tically) for each period from age 17 until their weight is actually observed. Thus, I use the
model to generate probabilities of an individual’s weight when weights are first recorded in
1981 (Khwaja, 2010).
29Approximately 2 percent of the white males in the full NLSY79 sample are married by age 17, and
less than 2 percent of the white males in the sample has a child by age 17. All individuals in the working
subsample (discussed in the data section) are single and childless at age 17.
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Figure 8:
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A.3 Additional State transitions - Marriage and Children
There are four possible values for marriage (Mt), delineated by spousal earnings.An
agent is single, married to a non/low earner, married to an average earner, or married to
a high earner. This earnings distinction is necessary for two reasons. First, differences in
spousal earnings are likely to create different incentives for labor force participation and
labor supply. Ceteris paribus, the spouses of high earners should respond differently to
wage shocks than spouses of low earners. I allow an individual’s weight to stochastically
influence his marriage and spousal income, as in Tosini (2008). As spousal earnings in turn
subsequently affect the relative utility appeal of employment alternatives, these differences
are worth capturing. The marriage state transitions stochastically, but exogenously. The
marriage transition probabilities (in log odds) are specified as follows:30
ln
P [Mt+1 = m
′|Mt = m,St,dt]
P [Mt+1 = 0|Mt = m,St,dt] = δ
M
m′ ⊗ [1,Mt, Edt, Bt, Bt ∗Mt, at, Yt],m′ = 1, 2, 3 (29)
Similarly, the probability transition for number of children,Kt, is specified (in log odds) as:
ln
P [Kt+1 = Kt + 1|St,dt]
P [Kt+1 = Kt|St,dt] = δ
K ⊗ [1, at, Kt, Edt, [Mt > 0], ht] (30)
A.4 Conditional Density Estimation - Parameter Results and In-
terpretation
Tables 12 and 13 contain the results from the conditional density estimation of wages,
which utilizes a logit hazard equation. A positive parameter value indicates that an increase
in the variable of interest increases the probability that wages will be observed in lower
30Marriage status and children themselves do not provide utility. Marriage is included as a stochastic state
to capture variation in employment decisions resulting from variation in unearned spousal income, which
enters the budget constraint. Due to the concavity of the utility function in consumption, this unearned
spousal income would decrease the optimal number of hours worked. Children influence stochastic weight
gain.
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Table 11: Estimates for State Transitions - Marriage and No. of Children
Marriage State Transitions Number of children
Outcome Mt+1 = 1 Mt+1 = 2 Mt+1 = 3 Kt+1 = Kt + 1
Variable Estimate ASE Estimate ASE Estimate ASE Variable Estimate ASE
Constant -2.824 0.064 -3.393 0.051 -4.108 0.612 Constant -1.032 0.098
Kt 0.0112 0.002 0.064 0.002 -0.161 0.002 Kt 0.054 0.024
Body Mass 0.004 0.002 0.021 0.004 -0.003 0.001 Edt -0.001 0.000
(Mt = 1) 5.653 0.349 3.859 0.198 2.835 0.108 hours -0.001 0.001
(Mt = 1) ∗Bt -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 -0.012 0.004 age -0.071 0.008
(Mt = 2) 4.55 0.234 6.476 0.096 4.355 0.074 age
2 0.000 0.002
(Mt = 2) ∗Bt -0.005 0.010 -0.002 0.005 0.005 0.001 (Mt = 1) 1.015 0.103
(Mt = 3) 4.049 0.211 4.734 0.128 6.737 0.142 (Mt = 2) 0.948 0.120
(Mt = 3) ∗Bt 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 (Mt = 3) 1.043 0.156
Education 0.001 0.000 -0.023 0.002 0.001 0.001 Bt -0.002 0.005
Hours -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
Wage 0.001 0.000 0.030 0.002 0.050 0.032
quantiles of the support of wages. Conversely, a negative value indicates that an increase in
the variable of interest will decrease the probability that wages will be observed in the low
part of the distribution of wages. Negative parameter values therefore indicate that increases
in the variable of interest lead to higher expected wages. Each variable is also interacted
with γ, a term that enables the effect of the variable to differ over the support of wages.
Specifically, letting K equal the number of quantiles used for CDE, γ = (−1) ∗ ln(K − k)
for each cell k in constructing the logit hazard probabilities (Gilleskie and Mroz, 2004).
Because for a positive variable x, the interaction term x ∗γ is negative, a positive parameter
value on x ∗ γ indicates a positive effect on expected wages, although that effect diminishes
in the upper quantiles of the support of wages. Parameter estimates for a variable x and
its interaction with γ must be interpreted jointly. For example, consider the effects of
a bachelor’s degree on wages in Professional occupations. The estimated parameter for a
bachelor’s degree is 0.162, indicating that having a bachelor’s degree increases the probability
that the individual’s wages will fall in the lowest quantile of wages (and in the second lowest
quantile, should the individual’s wage not be observed in the lowest quantile, and so on).
However, the estimated parameter on “bachelor’s degree*γ” is 0.295. Since in the lowest
quantile, γ = (−1) ∗ ln(25 − 1) = −3.17, the combined sign on the effects of a bachelor’s
degree is negative (0.162 + 0.295*-3.17 = -.773) indicating that individuals with a bachelor’s
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degree are less likely to be observed earning wages in the lowest quantile (and each successive
quantile to the penultimate quantile, if calculated). This combined result indicates that the
effect of the bachelor’s degree on the probability that a wage is observed in a given quantile
is most strongly negative in the lower parts of the distribution of wages.
B Details on Sample and Index Construction
This appendix contains details on the construction of the data set used to estimate the
model, namely particulars related to determining the years of completed schooling, correcting
for errors in reported wages, re-constructing missing years in the biennial portion of the
survey, reconstructing years pre-1979 for individuals aged greater than 17 at the outset of
the survey, and the regression specifics for connecting job requirement indices from the DOT
and O*NET.
B.1 Constructing Years of Schooling
The NLSY ’79 is contains notoriously messy data on years of completed schooling.
Information on individuals’ education decisions are available from the following questions:
• Since the last interview, had the individual been enrolled in school full-time, part-time,
or not at all? At what grade level level (e.g. High School, College, or GED)?
• Had the individual completed an additional grade since the last interview ? If so,
what was the previous highest completed grade? What was the new highest grade
completed?
• Has the individual attained any degrees since the last interview? If so, what is the
highest degree attained by the individual?
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In some circumstances, the reported data contain outcomes beyond the scope of the
model. Some of these instances are due to reporting error. Examples include individu-
als reporting reductions in grades completed, or oscillating between grade levels, advancing
grades without being enrolled in school, advancing three or more years in a single year (out-
side of GED completion), or failing to report changes in educational attainment until some
reconciliation round. Complications also arise from non-traditional education activities in-
cluding GED’s, accelerated degree-completion programs, very part-time enrollment in school
(e.g. one college course per year), and other educational enrollments which do not result in
traditional grade advancement (certificate programs, or cosmetology school).
Because this model allows for non-linear effects of high school and bachelor’s degrees on
wages and non-monetary costs of employment, it is important that indicator functions in the
constructed data for whether the individual has completed 12 or 16 years of schooling match
whether the individual actually has earned their high school or college degree. I therefore
used the following rules to determine whether an individual was enrolled in school, and if
they were enrolled full or part time, conditional on being enrolled.
• If an individual was enrolled in school in two consecutive years, and reported advancing
a grade in each year, I treated that as full time enrollment in school, regardless of
employment status.
• If an individual was enrolled in school in two years (consecutive or non-consecutive)
and reported advancing a total of one grade, I treated that circumstance as part-time
enrollment in each year.
• I disregarded GED’s. A person with a 9th grade education and a GED is treated as
having a ninth-grade education.
• If a person reported being enrolled in school for K years, and during that time advanced
one grade level, I treated the person as being enrolled part-time (jointly with whatever
employment decision they reported) for each of the last two years.
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• Suppose an individual reported having completed X years of school at time t. If
at some reconciliation year after t, say 1998 or 2008, the individual reported having
completed X + j years of school, and the individual had reported enrollment, but not
advancement in the years between t and t+ j, then I treated that as valid enrollment
in school. If the individual did not have sufficient enrollment years to reconcile the
difference, I treated the report in the reconciliation year as false.
• If an individual appears to have enrolled in an accelerated degree program, I credited
them with full-time enrollment in school for the years in school, but I cannot match
four years of completed school in two years.
• The model does not permit individuals to attend school full time and work, nor work
full time and attend school. In cases where the individual reported attending school
full time, working, and advancing a grade every other year, I treated that as part-time
work and part-time school. If the individual reports working in excess of 35 hours per
week, I recoded their hours worked to be 34 hour per week, or the highest value of
hours per week classified as ’part time’.
• All years of high school education are treated as full-time school.
• I assume that any work experience gained while attending high school does not im-
pact post high school decisions. The model does not therefore differentiate between
attending high school while working and attending high school and not working.
• If an agent is observed to advance a grade during high school range, they are classified
as attending full time school. If an agent is observed going to college and working full
time, they are recoded as working part time (albeit at the top of the hours range) and
attending school part time.
With these adjustments in place, I was able to reduce the percentage of mismatched
observations between the indicator functions for whether the individual’s constructed ’state
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variable’ for completed years of schooling was greater than 12 (or 16), and a similar function
for the individuals’ self-reported highest grade completed from approximately 5 percent to
0.9 percent.
B.2 Correcting for Errors in Reported Wages
In the NLSY ’79, hourly wages are a constructed variable. Individuals are asked about
their rate of pay and over what unit of time (hourly, daily, weekly, bi-weekly, monthly,
annually, etc.). Respondents are also asked about how many hours they work per week,
the numbers of weeks worked since the last interview. Reconciling this information with
reported spells of unemployment (meaning time spent not working rather than the BLS
definition), the NLSY estimates the total hours worked since the last interview. Estimates
of hourly rates of pay are constructed from these variables. In order to minimize the impact of
misreported/misrecorded wages, I used two criteria to determine if a reported wage required
further verification. First, I flagged a reported wage for further examination if an individual’s
wage was greater than $25.00 in 1983 dollars or less than minimum wage. Second, I examined
the reported wage if an individual’s wages increased or decreased more than 15 percent in a
single year.
I was able to correct or verify (or at least verify that the misreporting was internally
consistent) over 90 percent of these flagged wages because the mistakes were obvious in the
context provided by the primary variables. In most cases the fix was clear due to a decimal
(wage was within a small margin of 10x times the expected amount) or a misreported pay
interval (ratio of expected to reported wages was in the neighborhood of 2x, 4x, or 52/12x).
In the case of some wages flagged for discontinuity (wages increased more than 15 percent)
the change in wages was accompanied by a change in occupation. In the cases where I
lacked the data to plausibly correct the reported wage, I treated the wage as missing when
calculating the choice probability.
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B.3 Imputing Data for Missing Years in the Biennial Phase of the
NLSY ’79
In 1994, the NLSY switched from interviewing respondents on an annual basis to
conducting interviews biennially. However, the NLSY does contain sufficient information
to re-construct the data from the non-interview years for all variables except body weight,
as discussed in the section on empirical interpretation. More specifically, the NLSY asks
respondents about their tenure (in weeks) at their current job; their start date at their
current job; whether the respondent’s current wages are the same as their initial wages;
when was the current wage initiated; what was the preceding wage rate ; and start dates,
ending dates, hours, wages, and tenure at up to 4 additional jobs.
I imputed occupation in the non-interview years with according to the following rules:
• If the respondent is currently employed, and has been at that job longer than 78 weeks,
I assumed their occupation during the non-interview year was the same as the interview
year.
• If the respondent is currently unemployed, they reported being at their last job longer
than 52 weeks, and started that job within six months of the start of the calendar year
of the non-interview year, I used their primary occupation for their occupation during
the non-interview year.
• If the respondent has been at their current (primary) job less than 52 weeks, and
started their second job within three months prior to (or six months after) of the start
of the calendar year of the non-interview year, and they were at their second job for
longer than 26 weeks, I used the occupation of the second job as the occupation for
the non-interview year
• For any observations still missing occupations in the non-interview year, if the respon-
dent held more than two jobs since the last interview, and their tenure at their current
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job is less than 78 weeks, I used the occupation with the most hours worked over the
most weeks of the non-interview year as the primary occupation.
Occupation and hours were reported jointly for each ’job’ held. Hours were not updated
as were wages. I thusly used reported hours worked per week as paired with each occupation
for each job.
I imputed wages in the non-interview years according to the following rules:
• If I coded the respondent as having any occupation other than the primary - the
reported wage from that job was used.
• If the primary occupation was used, and the person reported no changes in wages since
starting that job, I used the reported wage from the primary occupation.
• If the primary occupation was used, and the person reported a change in wages occur-
ring in the last 12 months, I used the reported prior wage.
I used the age of the youngest child in the household to determine whether any child
births occurred during interview or non-interview years. I also used variables on marital
status, change in marital status since last interview, and date of change in marital status to
impute missing information on marital status in the missing period. If there was no change
in marital status over the two-year span between interviews, I used the difference in spousal
income during previous-calendar-year and spousal income since-last-interview to estimate
unearned (by respondent) spousal income during off years.
B.4 Imputing Data for Missing Years Pre-1979
I model individuals’ joint annual choices of occupation, hours of work, and schooling
from ages 17 on. However, the age of individuals in the NLSY ’1979 ranges from 14-22 at the
time of the initial interview. However, in that initial interview, respondents were asked about
school and employment history as far back as 1974. There is sufficient information, therefore,
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to reconstruct employment, marriage, child acquisition, school enrollment, and wages back
to age 17 for even the oldest individuals in the sample. However, as the historical data
in the first round is quite messy, I used the following variables and rules to construct the
individual’s decision history and initial conditions.
• The initial interview contains a question ”What was the last year you were in school?”
All years prior to that year, I treat as years of being in school. The initial condition for
years of completed schooling is then calculated by subtracting years of schooling since
age 17 from reported years of completed schooling at the time of the first interview.
• If the individual reported exiting school in 1978 or earlier, and their tenure at their
current job was greater than 78 weeks, I used reported occupation, hours, and wages
from that job for the individual’s employment decision in 1978.
• If the individual reported exiting school prior to 1978 and their tenure at the current
job was less than 78 weeks, I used the longest tenured job during 1978 (the survey
allowed individuals to report up to 5 jobs) for the occupation, hours, and wages data
for that year.
• I followed a similar procedure for years 1974-1977.
• If any conflicting information was present about whether the individual was working
or attending school, I assumed the individual was attending school.
• If at all unclear, I assumed the respondent attended school in the years they were ages
17-18.
Age of youngest child and dates of any current or previous marriage/divorces were also
available in the initial round. I used these variables to construct family history back to age
17. Three people in my working sample had children at age 17. I did not model this as
an initial condition, but rather imposed that the children were born in the first year of the
model, between ages 17 and 18 of the respondent.
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Table 14: DOT Requirement Values and Definitions
Value Interpretation
Physical Requirements
4 Very Heavy (Exerting 100+ lbs force occasionally, 50-100 lbs frequently)
3 Heavy (Exerting 50-100 lbs force occasionally, 20-50 lbs force frequently)
2 Medium (Exerting 20-50 lbs force occasionally, 10-25 lbs force frequently)
1 Light (Exerting 10-25 lbs force occasionally, up to 10 lbs frequently)
0 Sedentary (Exerting up to 10 lbs of force less than 1/3 of time)
Mental Requirements
6 Advanced Calculus (Math)
5 Read & Write Journal level work (Language); Advanced Algebra (Math)
4 Read & Write Business level material (Language); Basic Algebra (Math)
3 Read Shop Manuals, Proper Grammar (Language); Formulaic Computational Skills (Math)
2 Literacy Rate of 190 words per minute (Language); Four-function Computation (Math)
1 Literacy Rate of 95 words per minute (Language); Addition & Subtraction (Math)
Social Requirements
8 Mentoring
7 Negotiating
6 Instructing
5 Supervising
4 Diverting
3 Persuading
2 Speaking/Signalling
1 Serving
0 Taking Instructions/Helping
B.5 Connecting the Indices of Job Requirements Between DOT
and O*NET
As discussed briefly in the sections on data and empirical implementation, forming the
time varying indices of job requirements necessitated converting the rich scaling of O*NET
back to the coarser DOT data. The Dictionary of Occupational titles uses a 6-point scale for
two mental aspects of a job, mathematical and language abilities. For the mental requirement
of each DOT occupation (of which there are over 13,000 task level categories), I used the
max value of the Math and Language Ratings. I used the social rating as given in the
occupation’s DOT number and the physical rating as assigned. These values of these ratings
and their definitions are listed in Table 14.
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Table 15: Occupation categories assumed fixed
Requirement Occupation
Physical Requirements
Physical Administrative & Secretarial Occupations, Personal Service Occupations
Skilled Trades (SOC 43, 33, 35 49)
Mental Managerial Occupations, Plant Operatives, Associate Professionals
(SOC 51, 11, 21, 22)
Social Professional Occupations, Secretarial Occupatons (SOC 13, 43, 17, 19, 25)
The O*NET, by contrast, contains continuous 0-5 scales, interpretable as cardinal
numbers for both level and importance of over 100 aspects of each occupation. To convert the
O*NET ratings for each occupation to the DOT ratings for each occupation, I first multiplied
level and importance for each category for each occupation to get a single number for the
’intensity’ of a job requirement for an occupation. I then aggregated DOT tasks and O*NET
occupations (based on Census 2000) code to C70 occupation codes using BLS provided
weights for the O*NET and an arithmetic mean for the DOT ratings. I then used a Welsh
study from Felstead et al (2006) which studied the how occupations in the UK have changed
from 1986-2006. The authors estimated percentage changes in coarse job requirements along
such dimensions as literacy, mathematical skills, and physical requirements. In order to
connect the two indices to form a single time varying index of job requirements (for each
of physical, mental, and social), a conversion of O*NET measures to DOT measures is
needed. From the Felstead study, I used the skills of influence, client communication, and
horizontal communication as my measures for social skills, and the aforementioned categories
of interest for the mental and physical skills. Occupations which the authors treated as
having an percentage change of less than five percent in a given requirement, I treated as
being constant.
Under the assumption that the specific requirements of these occupations were changing
minimally, I used regression to convert the O*NET 1998 ratings to the DOT 1991 rating
scale as the requirements of these occupations did not sufficiently change. More specifically,
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I regressed the DOT 1991 ratings for physical, mental, and social requirements (aggregated
to the Census ’70) occupation code level on a set of requirements from O*NET). The results
of the specifications with the highest adjusted R2 are in Table 16.
In addition to converting the rich O*NET data to single indexed values, the output of
these regressions are useful in two ways. First, I can use the results from these regressions
(under the assumption that the subsets of the occupations used were, in fact, unchanging
in their requirements) to calculate 1998 values of requirements for all C70 occupations.
I assumed that changes in job requirements are smooth and linear from 1991-1998 for the
occupations not assumed unchanging for the purposes of calculation. Weighting C70 codes by
their CPS weights, I calculate the requirement index values for each of the five occupational
categories. Second, I can use the results from these regressions to calculate the intrinsic
changes in job requirements for each Census 70 occupation after 1998. Graphs of these
requirements are shown in Figure A.1.
Unfortunately, all of the lines in these graphs either have a hockey-stick shape, or dis-
play more variation after the conversion to the O*NET system of rating job requirements.
The primary motivation for replacing the DOT was that is not adequately capturing changes
in available jobs. The DOT was insufficiently agile to effectively track changes in the set
of available jobs, changes in required skills for each occupation, and was a relic of a man-
ufacturing based economy. I therefore believe if there is error in calculating changes in job
requirements, it results from insufficient variation in the DOT ratings rather than excess
variation in the O*NET system.
B.6 Supplementary Material on Food-Price Ratios
Per the data section, I construct a ratio of fast-food price to fresh-produce price for
each city in the ACCRA data base. The summary statistics for four years spread over the
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Table 16: Regression Results - DOT ratings on O*NET Ratings
Variable Estimate Std. Err.
Physical Rating R2=0.67
Speed of Limb Movement -0.004 0.016
Static Strength *** 0.099 0.011
Explosive Strength *** 0.055 0.018
Dynamic Strength 0.007 0.018
Trunk Strength ***-0.053 0.014
Stamina -0.001 0.022
Gross Body Coordination ** 0.040 0.019
Constant *** 0.957 0.055
Mental Rating R2=0.71
Written Comprehension 0.004 0.017
Oral Comprehension *** 0.039 0.012
Mathematical Reasoning -0.012 0.017
Mathematics *** 0.036 0.014
Writing *** 0.038 0.013
Reading Comprehension *** 0.079 0.019
Constant *** 1.554 0.094
Social Requirements R2=0.66
Active Listening * 0.036 0.020
Monitoring -0.028 0.019
Social Perceptiveness *** 0.131 0.022
Persuasion -0.004 0.040
Negotiation ** 0.063 0.031
Instructing 0.021 0.019
Service Orientation **-0.035 0.018
Mgmt of Personnel Resource ** 0.024 0.012
Constant *** 1.928 0.198
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sample are included listed in the table below. Unfortunately, the UNC library only has
ACCRA data as far back as 1981. I used 1981 ratios for all prior years.31.
The ACCRA data base contains data on prices of various goods in 300 cities and
Metropolitan statistical areas. Approximately 71 percent of the working sample lives in
an MSA about which ACCRA reports data. For individual/year observations where the
respondent was living in a FIPS code not covered by ACCRA, I assigned them ACCRA
prices from closest geographic city. An alternative strategy of imputing missing prices would
be to match the missing geographic area to the closest reported geographic area of a similar
size. However, as small towns are sparse in the ACCRA database, it is often infeasible to
match small market or rural areas within a neighboring state area.
Table 17: Summary Statistics - Ratio of Food Prices from ACCRA
Year Mean S. D. Min Max
1982 2.54 0.28 2.03 3.89
1991 2.86 0.27 2.18 4.38
2001 4.38 0.49 2.58 5.78
2008 4.26 0.55 3.31 5.57
31Adjusting for inflation is irrelevant - the ratio would remain constant under global price adjustment
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